92 protesters and an indymedia journalist occupied the Diaz Pertini school , of which 87 were injured. Later, the horror did not stop as 81 protesters were forcibly removed from San Martino hospital and taken to Bolzenato detention centre. Despite some having been seriously injured, they endured three days at the mercy of National Alliance (facist party) prison police, where many were beaten again, psychogically tortured, given with little food and water or medical assistance before being deported.

Two buildings were raided that night. Diaz pascoli and Diaz pertini. bothe were schools and were supplied to the Genoa Social forum (GSF- a umbrella organisation of over 900 protest groups that took part in the protests over the prievious three days) were supplied by the Genoa council. The GSF and indymedia occupied the Pascoli, whilst Diaz pertini was used as domitory. Indymedia was seriously hit and badly damaged losing many computers during the raid and with one indymedia journalist almost killed outside. Diaz Pertini became a bloodbath and massacre inside 15 minutes as the first wave of 80 special riot police entered beating everybody they found.

In the days and weeks after the diaz raid and as the victims began to recover, the Genoa Prosecutor's office launched a comprehensive criminal investigation into what the police did. the investigation was lead by Dr Enrico Zucca. Three and a half years later, 75 italian anti-terrorist officers, DIGOS, special anti-riot squadron commanders, police prison officers & men were charged with various charges ranging from attempted murder, conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, planting false evidence, assault and GBH amoungst others. the criminal process was divided in to two trials. Diaz with 28 and Bolzenato with 47. In June of 2004 the chages were confirmed and 260 pages investigation report was sent to the interior ministry from Zucca's office.

Because Berlusconi owns most of the media, parts of the report that were leaked were suppressed and barely reported in italy late last year. due to other legal and translation difficulties which have now been resolved (the document became public the moment the charges were comfirmed), Zucca's report has not been released in english until now. This Blog can publish the conclusion of his report as the first part that is being released on to the internet.

The Conclusion (R.G.N.R 14525/01/21

In the aftermath of the tragic events that occurred during the police operation in the Diaz School, there was a general sense of the gravity of the situation combined with a feeling that it would be impossible to identify the individuals responsible. This stemmed from the chaotic nature of the operation and the fact that so many men from different divisions were acting en masse. However, by the end of the parliamentary inquiry it was clear that excessive and anomalous behaviour had occurred, encouraged by a lack of coordination and by organizational holes in the entire operation. Nevertheless, it could not be said that this was what those in charge of the operation had wanted or ordered, either in the preparatory or executory phases; nor could this behaviour be considered so widespread as to be indicative of a degeneration within the police overall.

The brief inquiry by Prefect Micalizio reached the same conclusion. However, it also concluded there had been serious disciplinary negligence on the part of those in charge who attended the operation, including the defendants Luperi, Gratteri, Canterini, Dominici and Mortola.

Illegal conduct was noted during the incursion into the Pascoli School, which - given the presence in the building of the GSF and the alternative information centres - appeared connected to political interests or problems, as highlighted in the parliamentary committee's debate. In addition, there were the Diaz Pertini School episodes, undoubtedly more glaring and serious, which at the time appeared to indicate nothing more than an excessive use of force by police.
Faced with evidence that contradicted the official version given in the original press release immediately after the operation, a second version emerged. This indicated an undeniable deviation from professional standards but the gravity of the violence inflicted on the occupants led to the conclusion - perhaps unconsciously to avoid the disturbing idea of more widespread and generalized violence - that these were isolated incidents borne of the days of tension and generated by the context. Once again, however, any conclusion that the police behaviour had been uniform clashed with the admission that there had been isolated incidents. Identifying the individuals involved was left to the investigating Judicial Authority, who was also looking into the reported abuses. There were calls and promises that those responsible for these isolated incidents should be pursued rigorously and punished accordingly.

However, as shown by the summary, the investigations verified that, in reality, the breakdown in appropriate behaviour - within an operation already considered very complex and sensitive for obvious reasons - was widespread and affected various different levels of those overseeing the forces deployed, including individuals at the very top of the command chain. This was not only the case in regards to the military and repressive aspects of the operation but also in regards to the investigative side, which was the whole purpose of the intervention. This offered a glimpse of a more disturbing reality, more clearly implicating the institutional and organizational approaches used.

A situation developed, responsibility for which could not just be chalked up to negligence. The scenario that emerged cannot merely be attributed to unprofessional behaviour, approximation and negligence forming a kind of chain of "errors ", whose concurrence and convergence appear increasingly unlikely. Instead, the picture that emerges is that of a conscious and deliberate action, which, with the apparent scope of justice, used every means of achieving its aims, forgetting that justice can only be achieved by following the rules.

It should also be taken into consideration the fact that nothing ever came of judicial proceedings against some 250 of those arrested during the summit in the act [of committing the alleged crime]. Either the arrests were not approved or the public prosecutor dropped the charges owing to lack of evidence. Furthermore, leaving to one side the 93 people arrested during the operation under discussion, other instances of [abusive] arrest were investigated following detailed complaints. Judicial action has already been taken with regards to this or else preliminary investigations are under way regarding the falsification of reports by police. Considering past court cases, there can be no doubt that the figures suggest an entirely unique situation, made even more anomalous by the fact that the number of those arrested was far below predictions made by the administration itself. It appears clear that everything considered, elements must have been twisted, which is the only way to explain how utterly straightforward evidence, such as that required to support an arrest "in the act of committing a crime", fell apart at the first test of legitimacy.

On many occasions, and notably in the operation targeted by this current investigation, the utmost risk was taken: that owing to probable human costs, the coercive intervention would be subject to various checks, including judicial appraisal, even more so in the event of arrests.

The pressure to obtain results combined with a sense that repeated criminal action was going unpunished, clearly led the police to believe they had justification - even in the face of public outcry - to pursue individuals they believed were "substantially guilty", irrespective of whether they had the necessary evidence, which they were, however, ready to manipulate if needs be.

It is not the judicial investigation's job to analyse possible general reasons underlying behaviour resulting in the action being charged but these are certainly relevant to questions regarding the verification and understanding of the reasons for the criminal conduct.

On the basis of the reconstruction, decisions on what action to take following the entry and search were clearly conditioned by the importance of what was at stake and the need to produce a result, which at that moment not only failed to match the high expectations that had developed but actually appeared likely to prove the opposite. It's possible that an open admission that the operation had failed would not only have been held to reflect mistakes made at a broad level, but that this would also have had repercussions on individual careers and even undermined the image of the committed institution that the defendants represented. In other words a "reason of state" that allowed them to take the shortcut of the end justifying the means. The full involvement of the defendants in their respective positions throughout the summit, the work many of them had dedicated to preparing for the event, the tension during the dramatic periods of public order and security, could all have played a part in shaping the ideas of those who were at the peak of a battle they felt they had to win. The "political" nature of the opposition to the violent [section of demonstrators] inevitably led to simplifications and a blurring of definitions, both in identifying the enemy and in understanding the values being represented and defended.

Defences based on showing - even after the arrests were all declared illegal - that the operation had had a "just" purpose (to identify and stop individuals that might have been responsible for criminal actions carried out by members of the violent fringe) were almost instinctive. The later discovery that some of the foreigners arrested had had former brushes with the police for crimes connected to disturbing the peace were hailed as proof that the arrests had been justified and appropriate.

Such considerations appear to completely miss the point that the importance of judicial punishment is that it cannot be redeemed or counterbalanced by a person's qualities or precedents; that these could not possibly have formed part of the police evaluations as they were not known at the time the decisions were being taken.

The obstinacy in insisting that elements acquired later legitimised the results - regardless of the clear faults in the operation and evidence of the abuse carried out - is representative of an attitude that is still unable to grasp the importance of respecting the rules of obtaining proof and engaging in professionally correct behaviour.

All the conduct attributed to the defendants - as well as other behaviour that cannot be attributed to them but which nevertheless has been shown to have occurred during the Diaz operation - express the conviction that "adjusting" or artificially "improving" the evidence against certain individuals is behaviour that, rather than deviating from the aim of the institutions, is instead required as a way of achieving this aim.

This conviction is probably at the basis of every illegal act committed by the police, whenever they are not motivated by exclusively personal aims. It originates in entirely commendable intentions, which translate into illegal behaviour. This is nevertheless considered acceptable at the point in which it becomes clear that following the rules and procedures will mean that those individuals - who are considered guilty - will not be punished.

In this light, an apparently banal detail uncovered during the investigation assumes great significance. While some elements considered fundamental to the arrests - such as the occupants' alleged resistance to police entering the building - have gradually been refuted by everyone, the only incident that the defendants explicitly and angrily distanced themselves were accusations they planted the Molotov cocktails.

This can be seen to have a double layer of importance. On the one hand, this element more than any other was of an objective nature, leaving no room for alternative interpretations as the bottles had originally been found kilometres away under circumstances entirely unconnected to the present operation. Yet proof otherwise was all based purely on statements made by personal statements. On the other hand, there was the symbolic value of having falsified the piece of evidence, which, more than anything else, showed the dangerous nature of the individuals arrested. This evoked the scenario of a city gripped by the destructive rage of demonstrators but would instead turn out to be one of the most disgraceful acts committed by the police.

It is more difficult [for the occupants] to refute other such falsehoods and fabrications, precisely because they are linked to a single explanatory source mentioned in the service report and in the records signed by police; this is particularly the case if the rebuttal comes from those individuals painted as guilty. If similar indignation was not expressed [on the part of the police] in these circumstances, it could well be linked to the belief that a twisted account will be considered - first by the public prosecutor and then by the judge - with a certain amount of indulgence, almost taking for granted the future testimony of the "good policeman"; a policeman allowed to adjust the details, transform a hurled object into a hail of objects, the sound of glass breaking into a description of broken bottles, creating doubts over who an object belongs to by omitting its discovery, failing to register it as evidence, transporting it to a place, then "unintentionally" tampering with filmed evidence and so on. It's difficult to ignore the common thread.
Declarations of having played no part in fabricating evidence by planting the Molotov cocktails were not fully investigated (not only due to existence of footage) but only sufficiently to conclude it had fallen within an "acceptable" level of manipulating evidence - as though having seen or found the bottles in the courtyard, in the school, on the stairs, on one floor or another, was entirely irrelevant, it being enough for the expert, upright official that they had been found "in the context" of the operation. Some version would undoubtedly have been produced for the judge, but this would be a mere technicality if the proof could not match up to the required precision and efficiency - elements that didn't interest the police.

The investigation started by the Public Prosecutor's Office at the request of the judges - conducted with the necessary determination to ensure a full reinstatement of the rules and recognition of the rights that had been violated - were taken as a betrayal. There were repeated accusations, and not only in the out-of-court propaganda - that the Office was relying on collective responsibility rather than tracing down the individuals responsible. But these reactions and attitudes hide the fact that the police were only ready to admit deviation and abuse when the charges were framed against unknown and unidentifiable individuals. There have been repeated hints at the difficulties encountered in even determining the individuals present at the operation, which cannot just be blamed on the chaotic manner in which they were brought into the operation.

However, once concluded, the investigation revealed the existence of objective elements. These produced an adequate and comprehensive response to the main questions that had appeared destined to remain unanswered owing to the expected [police] reaction of trying to blur individual responsibility within the group action. Leaving to one side proof provided by the available footage, the plaintiff statements are still subject to development; this is because it is only once all the oral evidence is laid out in the trial that the detail with which events inside the Diaz School can be reconstructed will become clear. Only then will it be possible to fully evaluate the contradictions and utter implausibility of every claim made by the defendants. It will become clear how unconvincing are claims of not having seen, not having been a direct witness to events. The reason for records that are apparently authorless will also become clear.
It will become plainly apparent that the impossibility of verifying operations carried out by public officials was a way of covering up illegal behaviour, which each of the defendants assumed as his own by using them as justification for the arrests.

Indictment was not requested for the defendants out of a kind of retaliation; instead, efforts have been made to distinguish and analyse responsibility, in a manner certainly not used in regards to the Diaz victims.
A rigorous standard of proof has been adopted, far beyond the criteria required under the Criminal Procedure Code Art 125 for a criminal action. But beyond a careful evaluation of the proof, nothing more can be asked of the judge - in part, to exorcize the potentially negative impact of this case from the mere fact that individuals holding an institutional role are being subject to trial. The final decision must always rest with the judge, so long as one is operating within a constitutional system, characterized by legality, the keystone of which must be the equality of every citizen in the eyes of the law.