They Send Women US Soldiers there just to goad the prisoners - The Girls Love it

They Send Women US Soldiers there just to goad the prisoners - The Girls Love it

Leased from CUba - This COercion must end

Leased from CUba - This COercion must end

Help us protest US Terror Regime

Help us protest US Terror Regime

Help Us protest US Terrror Regime

Help Us protest US Terrror Regime

Balloons of Shame for Bush/Cheney Torture Regime

If the US Congress does not immediately establish a very broad Special Investigation of torture by the US administration, then this is a text book case where the International Criminal Court should initiate proceedings against the suspects (Dickey Chenney, Karpinsky, CIA Directors Tenet, John McLaughlin and Porter J. Goss, Major General Geoffrey Miller, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld – among dozens.).

Join the Organizing Committee for Guantanamo Protests

A Desperate Letter to the Cuban People:

Dear Comrade Fidel Castro and the People of Cuba,

We are tired of listening to the reports of US torture and criminal activity in the Middle East and at the Cuban territory illegally occupied by the US at Guantanamo. We seek your permission to allow a few US citizens to approach the base and to float some large green balloons saying: “Shame GW Bush – Shame the ICC” and STOP THE TORTURE & ILLEGAL DETENTION!”

We are environmental and anti-imperialist activists who have done many big actions, including: A large banner (Que Se Vayan Todos) over the Cancun WTO convention and a banner to protest Redwood logging in Northern California – from the Golden Gate bridge with Woody Harelson.

We understand that in a protest of this kind done from the ground (by land) that the Cuban people through their government must take into account their greater interests and concerns before supporting or allowing such a protest. There is a precedent for allowing such activity: at the Cancun WTO, the Mexican government ruled that protesters had the right to be there because they were not protesting the Mexican government and it was an international meeting.

We hope that something can be done to bring the US crimes at Guantanamo and elsewhere into more public awareness.

Thank You for your consideration and your 50 years of struggle against imperialism.

Garbo and Winters Smith

Phoenix, Arizona

Contact us through green_meansgreen@lycos

Or post your messages publicly here:

Notes on Torture and US Illegal Coercion

Declaration of Sergio Stanzani, President of No Peace Without Justice:

"It is symbolic that this news [of US attempts top subvert the ICC] comes during the celebration of International Human Rights Day, in a context in which the United States would without doubt have more to gain than to lose by joining the International Criminal Court, particularly given the severe criticism of detention conditions for the prisoners of Guantanamo Bay and the condemnation of torture committed in Iraqi jails. Unfortunately, this development is not unexpected or surprising. Furthermore, by taking this decision, the United States has isolated itself even more within the international process of democratisation, at the very moment in which the ICC is formally beginning its investigations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Uganda.

"We await the European Union’s reaction with interest and we wonder whether it would reaffirm its leadership in promoting and supporting the ICC by proposing to cover at least part of the American funds that will be withheld from these struggling States. This would set an example to the world and be a strong statement in favour of international criminal justice, as well as providing effective support to those States that are taking firm steps down the path towards Democracy."

For further information:

The US refuses to apply the Geneva Convention for detainees in Afghanistan. It continues
to press for bilateral agreements to provide its citizens immunity from prosecution of the International Criminal Court (Congress legislation last year to penalise those who refuse).

But nothing shows the disregard of international law as clearly as the attempts by the US, UK and some European countries to set aside the absolute prohibition of torture and ill treatment by re-definition and "rendering" – or the transfer prisoners to regimes that are known to use torture. In effect sub-contracting torture, yet keeping their own hands and conscience clean.

Under this dangerous agenda, justice is not only denied, it is also distorted.

In the UK, shortly after the House of Lords threw out the law on arbitrary detention of foreigners, the government rapidly introduced a new form of detention – this time in one’s own home.

In the US, almost a year after the Supreme Court decided that detainees in Guantanamo should have access to judicial review, not one single case from among the 500 or so detained has reached the courts because of stonewalling by the Administration.

Under this agenda some people are above the law and others are clearly outside it.

Guantanamo has become the gulag our times, entrenching the notion that people can be detained without any recourse to the law.

If Guantanamo evokes images of Soviet repression, "ghost detainees" – or the incommunicado detention of unregistered detainees - bring back the practice of "disappearances" so popular with Latin American dictators in the past.

According to US official sources there could be over 100 ghost detainees held by the US.

In 2004 thousands of people were held by the US in Iraq, hundreds in Afghanistan and undisclosed numbers in undisclosed locations.

AI is calling on the US Administration to "close Guantanamo and disclose the rest". What we mean by this is: either release the prisoners or charge and prosecute them with due process.

By peddling the politics of fear and division, this new agenda has also encouraged intolerance, racism, and xenophobia.

In 2004 our Report recorded incidents of religious humiliation of detainees in US custody, growing anti-Semitism in western Europe, including France and Belgium, and Islamophobia in Europe and North America. Ironic that this should happen as we mark the 60th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz.

Furthermore, the US, as the unrivalled political, military and economic Super Power, sets the tone of governmental behaviour world-wide. By thumbing its nose at the rule of law and human rights, what message does the US send to repressive regimes who have little regard for the rule of law anyway?

By lowering the human rights standards, the US has weakened its own moral authority to speak out on human rights.

By actively supporting repressive regimes as allies in the War on Terror, US, the EU and others actually promote greater insecurity. Uzbekistan is a case point. Belated calls for transparency and accountability cannot hide their earlier support and silence on human rights abuse by Karimov’s government.

Throughout 2005, AI has also highlighted the double speak of the EU member states. They undermine their own credibility when they open dialogue on human rights with Iran, China, and Egypt but deafeningly silent on Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib. It throws doubt on the EU’s ability and willingness to provide a genuine value-and rule-based alternative leadership.

However, despite the failure of leadership from key governments, the new agenda was not without opposition in 2004. The voices of resistance and positive developments gave us hope and energy.

For instance:

• Judgements of the US Supreme Court and the UK House of Lords
• The tide against impunity in Latin America.
• New ratifications to the International Criminal Court.
• Continued abolition of the death penalty – though a lot still remains to be done - bringing the total number of abolitionists to 84.
• Initiatives to reform the UN security and human rights machinery

March 13, 2003. Arusha, March 12th (FH) - Outgoing president of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Judge Navanethem Pillay of South Africa, is one of the eighteen judges recently elected to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Shortly before her swearing in on Tuesday, Pillay told the independent news agency Hirondelle about the achievements and failures of the ICTR during her four-year term as president of the court. She also speaks about challenges faced by the ICC and the future of International Criminal law.

“Only 89 countries have ratified the statute of the ICC. That leaves out more than one half of the member countries of the UN, and it also includes the world's superpower, the United States. The court will function because we have the judges, the statute and the rules. We will judge individual criminal responsibilities in terms of the evidence that is presented before us. So it will not affect the independence of the court. But the court can only function with the cooperation and the support of states, not only financial support, but logistical support to pass on the information and help the prosecutor with investigations, arrests and transfers of witnesses. Both the UN tribunal for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia received such cooperation from member states. With regard to the functioning of the ICC, I acknowledge that we may have difficulties since there isn't a high level of support. Secondly, the fact that the USA has not given its support and is taking steps to influence other countries, like India, by signing bilateral agreements requiring those countries not to cooperate, may be perceived by the international community as the ICC dispensing justice selectively. In other words the prosecutor will only be authorised to prosecute crimes committed in some areas and not similar crimes committed elsewhere. For a court to earn the name of an international court, exercising universal jurisdiction, we should be empowered to put on trial all indicted persons who committed similar crimes. I hope that as the court gets acceptance, many more countries will ratify.
H: Does it mean that the ICC has no provision whatsoever to prosecute persons from countries which have not ratified its statute no matter what crimes they commit?
NP: As it stands, that is the position. The state concerned has to consent if it is not a ratifying state. In other instances, if it is a ratifying state they just have the option to hold national prosecutions. So the ICC does not have supervening jurisdiction. It has to wait for the national process to take place.
H. Considering a case like that of detainees held by the US on Guantanamo Bay, do you think this is a violation of international laws that should be considered by the ICC?
NP: The ICC does not have the reach or jurisdiction over individuals like that, but what the world expects and what many judges in the USA have told me is that they have serious reservations about the military court that president Bush was about to set up. The whole purpose of setting up the international court was to set up an independent international court which will exercise jurisdiction in cases like this. That would be our appropriate role, but we are denied that role because the USA has not ratified the ICC.

International Criminal Court; in Dilemma over Kony; By Peter Magomu-Mashate
Monitor (Kampala)
January 21, 2005 fundamental difference between the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or World Court which is a civil tribunal that hears disputes between countries, is that, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is able to investigate and prosecute those individuals accused of crimes against humanity, genocide, and crimes of war, and will step in only if national courts are unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute such crimes.

The ICC is charged to help defend rights of those, such as women and children, who have often had little recourse to justice. The UN contributes funds, especially when the ICC investigates and prosecutes cases referred to it by the UN Security Council.

The treaty gives the ICC jurisdiction that is complementary to existing national judicial systems or jurisdictions. This 'principle of complementarity' as it is known gives states the primary responsibility and duty to prosecute the most serious international crimes, while allowing the ICC to step in only as a last resort if states fail to implement their duty.

The US hostility to the ICC has increased dramatically in 2002. The crux of the US concern relates to the prospect that the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction to conduct politically motivated investigations and prosecutions of US military and political personnel, for example Gen Wesley Clarke who led NATO in bombing Milosevic out of power in Belgrade. Indeed, the US opposition is in stark contrast to the strong support for the Court by most of America's closet allies.
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The two resignations yesterday, of Deputy Director of Operations Stephen R. Kappes and his deputy, Michael Sulick, will "undermine the morale of the workforce that had undergone a renaissance since the failures of 9/11," she said.
Goss yesterday named the current director of the counterterrorism center to replace Kappes. His name is being withheld by The Post because he is still undercover. He is a 28-year employee with lengthy experience in Latin America and was the chief of station in Mexico, according to several former CIA officers.

"There will be no gap in our operations fighting the global war on terror, nor in any of our other vital activities," Goss said in a separate statement released yesterday.

Kappes is a widely respected officer who helped persuade Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi to renounce weapons of mass destruction this year. Sulick, whose career includes assignments in South America, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, headed the agency's counterintelligence center until becoming Kappes's deputy. Both are highly regarded by clandestine service colleagues, said 10 former CIA officials who worked with them.

Also last week, the agency's deputy director, John E. McLaughlin, retired.

The personnel moves follow a series of confrontations between Goss's new chief of staff, Patrick Murray, and senior operations staff members.

McCain also cited a leak of information about Michael V. Kostiw, Goss's initial choice for the number three position at the agency, as evidence of partisan opposition to the new director. That leak, concerning a 20-year-old shoplifting incident, resulted in Kostiw's withdrawal from consideration for that job. He is now a special assistant to Goss.

"The information was leaked before he even got there," McCain said.

Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV (W.Va.), ranking Democrat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said that he had expected changes at the CIA based on past failures but that Goss "must provide some explanation for this rash of departures among senior officials."

In 1977, when retired admiral Stansfield Turner was named CIA director by President Jimmy Carter, he brought to agency headquarters what one former CIA official described as "a Navy boarding party armed with sabers." Turner's aides fired several senior clandestine officials, and although the actions were resented they were never believed to have had partisan motives.

American soldiers brutalized Iraqis. How far up does the responsibility go?
Issue of 2004-05-10
Posted 2004-04-30

General Taguba saved his harshest words for the military-intelligence officers and private contractors. He recommended that Colonel Thomas Pappas, the commander of one of the M.I. brigades, be reprimanded and receive non-judicial punishment, and that Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordan, the former director of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, be relieved of duty and reprimanded. He further urged that a civilian contractor, Steven Stephanowicz, of CACI International, be fired from his Army job, reprimanded, and denied his security clearances for lying to the investigating team and allowing or ordering military policemen “who were not trained in interrogation techniques to facilitate interrogations by ‘setting conditions’ which were neither authorized” nor in accordance with Army regulations. “He clearly knew his instructions equated to physical abuse,” Taguba wrote. He also recommended disciplinary action against a second CACI employee, John Israel. (A spokeswoman for CACI said that the company had “received no formal communication” from the Army about the matter.)

“I suspect,” Taguba concluded, that Pappas, Jordan, Stephanowicz, and Israel “were either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuse at Abu Ghraib,” and strongly recommended immediate disciplinary action.

The problems inside the Army prison system in Iraq were not hidden from senior commanders. During Karpinski’s seven-month tour of duty, Taguba noted, there were at least a dozen officially reported incidents involving escapes, attempted escapes, and other serious security issues that were investigated by officers of the 800th M.P. Brigade. Some of the incidents had led to the killing or wounding of inmates and M.P.s, and resulted in a series of “lessons learned” inquiries within the brigade. Karpinski invariably approved the reports and signed orders calling for changes in day-to-day procedures. But Taguba found that she did not follow up, doing nothing to insure that the orders were carried out. Had she done so, he added, “cases of abuse may have been prevented.”

General Taguba further found that Abu Ghraib was filled beyond capacity, and that the M.P. guard force was significantly undermanned and short of resources. “This imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions, escapes, and accountability lapses,” he wrote. There were gross differences, Taguba said, between the actual number of prisoners on hand and the number officially recorded. A lack of proper screening also meant that many innocent Iraqis were wrongly being detained—indefinitely, it seemed, in some cases. The Taguba study noted that more than sixty per cent of the civilian inmates at Abu Ghraib were deemed not to be a threat to society, which should have enabled them to be released. Karpinski’s defense, Taguba said, was that her superior officers “routinely” rejected her recommendations regarding the release of such prisoners.

Karpinski was rarely seen at the prisons she was supposed to be running, Taguba wrote General Karpinski was formally admonished and quietly suspended, and a major investigation into the Army’s prison system, authorized by Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, the senior commander in Iraq, was under way. A fifty-three-page report, obtained by The New Yorker, written by Major General Antonio M. Taguba and not meant for public release, was completed in late February. Its conclusions about the institutional failures of the Army prison system were devastating. Specifically, Taguba found that between October and December of 2003 there were numerous instances of “sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses” at Abu Ghraib. This systematic and illegal abuse of detainees, Taguba reported, was perpetrated by soldiers of the 372nd Military Police Company, and also by members of the American intelligence community. (The 372nd was attached to the 320th M.P. Battalion, which reported to Karpinski’s brigade headquarters.) Taguba’s report listed some of the wrongdoing:

Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees; pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair; threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick, and using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee.

There was stunning evidence to support the allegations, Taguba added—“detailed witness statements and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence.” Photographs and videos taken by the soldiers as the abuses were happening were not included in his report, Taguba said, because of their “extremely sensitive nature.”

The photographs—several of which were broadcast on CBS’s “60 Minutes 2” last week—show leering G.I.s taunting naked Iraqi prisoners who are forced to assume humiliating poses. Six suspects—Staff Sergeant Ivan L. Frederick II, known as Chip, who was the senior enlisted man; Specialist Charles A. Graner; Sergeant Javal Davis; Specialist Megan Ambuhl; Specialist Sabrina Harman; and Private Jeremy Sivits—are now facing prosecution in Iraq, on charges that include conspiracy, dereliction of duty, cruelty toward prisoners, maltreatment, assault, and indecent acts. A seventh suspect, Private Lynndie England, was reassigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, after becoming pregnant.

The photographs tell it all. In one, Private England, a cigarette dangling from her mouth, is giving a jaunty thumbs-up sign and pointing at the genitals of a young Iraqi, who is naked except for a sandbag over his head, as he masturbates. Three other hooded and naked Iraqi prisoners are shown, hands reflexively crossed over their genitals. A fifth prisoner has his hands at his sides. In another, England stands arm in arm with Specialist Graner; both are grinning and giving the thumbs-up behind a cluster of perhaps seven naked Iraqis, knees bent, piled clumsily on top of each other in a pyramid. There is another photograph of a cluster of naked prisoners, again piled in a pyramid. Near them stands Graner, smiling, his arms crossed; a woman soldier stands in front of him, bending over, and she, too, is smiling. Then, there is another cluster of hooded bodies, with a female soldier standing in front, taking photographs. Yet another photograph shows a kneeling, naked, unhooded male prisoner, head momentarily turned away from the camera, posed to make it appear that he is performing oral sex on another male prisoner, who is naked and hooded.

Such dehumanization is unacceptable in any culture, but it is especially so in the Arab world. Homosexual acts are against Islamic law and it is humiliating for men to be naked in front of other men, Bernard Haykel, a professor of Middle Eastern studies at New York University, explained. “Being put on top of each other and forced to masturbate, being naked in front of each other—it’s all a form of torture,” Haykel said.

Two Iraqi faces that do appear in the photographs are those of dead men. There is the battered face of prisoner No. 153399, and the bloodied body of another prisoner, wrapped in cellophane and packed in ice. There is a photograph of an empty room, splattered with blood.

The 372nd’s abuse of prisoners seemed almost routine—a fact of Army life that the soldiers felt no need to hide. On April 9th, at an Article 32 hearing (the military equivalent of a grand jury) in the case against Sergeant Frederick, at Camp Victory, near Baghdad, one of the witnesses, Specialist Matthew Wisdom, an M.P., told the courtroom what happened when he and other soldiers delivered seven prisoners, hooded and bound, to the so-called “hard site” at Abu Ghraib—seven tiers of cells where the inmates who were considered the most dangerous were housed. The men had been accused of starting a riot in another section of the prison. Wisdom said:

SFC Snider grabbed my prisoner and threw him into a pile. . . . I do not think it was right to put them in a pile. I saw SSG Frederic, SGT Davis and CPL Graner walking around the pile hitting the prisoners. I remember SSG Frederick hitting one prisoner in the side of its [sic] ribcage. The prisoner was no danger to SSG Frederick. . . . I left after that.

When he returned later, Wisdom testified:

I saw two naked detainees, one masturbating to another kneeling with its mouth open. I thought I should just get out of there. I didn’t think it was right . . . I saw SSG Frederick walking towards me, and he said, “Look what these animals do when you leave them alone for two seconds.” I heard PFC England shout out, “He’s getting hard.”

Wisdom testified that he told his superiors what had happened, and assumed that “the issue was taken care of.” He said, “I just didn’t want to be part of anything that looked criminal.”

The abuses became public because of the outrage of Specialist Joseph M. Darby, an M.P. whose role emerged during the Article 32 hearing against Chip Frederick. A government witness, Special Agent Scott Bobeck, who is a member of the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division, or C.I.D., told the court, according to an abridged transcript made available to me, “The investigation started after SPC Darby . . . got a CD from CPL Graner. . . . He came across pictures of naked detainees.” Bobeck said that Darby had “initially put an anonymous letter under our door, then he later came forward and gave a sworn statement. He felt very bad about it and thought it was very wrong.”

Questioned further, the Army investigator said that Frederick and his colleagues had not been given any “training guidelines” that he was aware of. The M.P.s in the 372nd had been assigned to routine traffic and police duties upon their arrival in Iraq, in the spring of 2003. In October of 2003, the 372nd was ordered to prison-guard duty at Abu Ghraib. Frederick, at thirty-seven, was far older than his colleagues, and was a natural leader; he had also worked for six years as a guard for the Virginia Department of Corrections. Bobeck explained:

What I got is that SSG Frederick and CPL Graner were road M.P.s and were put in charge because they were civilian prison guards and had knowledge of how things were supposed to be run.

Bobeck also testified that witnesses had said that Frederick, on one occasion, “had punched a detainee in the chest so hard that the detainee almost went into cardiac arrest.”

At the Article 32 hearing, the Army informed Frederick and his attorneys, Captain Robert Shuck, an Army lawyer, and Gary Myers, a civilian, that two dozen witnesses they had sought, including General Karpinski and all of Frederick’s co-defendants, would not appear. Some had been excused after exercising their Fifth Amendment right; others were deemed to be too far away from the courtroom. “The purpose of an Article 32 hearing is for us to engage witnesses and discover facts,” Gary Myers told me. “We ended up with a c.i.d. agent and no alleged victims to examine.” After the hearing, the presiding investigative officer ruled that there was sufficient evidence to convene a court-martial against Frederick.

Myers, who was one of the military defense attorneys in the My Lai prosecutions of the nineteen-seventies, told me that his client’s defense will be that he was carrying out the orders of his superiors and, in particular, the directions of military intelligence. He said, “Do you really think a group of kids from rural Virginia decided to do this on their own? Decided that the best way to embarrass Arabs and make them talk was to have them walk around nude?”

In letters and e-mails to family members, Frederick repeatedly noted that the military-intelligence teams, which included C.I.A. officers and linguists and interrogation specialists from private defense contractors, were the dominant force inside Abu Ghraib. In a letter written in January, he said:

I questioned some of the things that I saw . . . such things as leaving inmates in their cell with no clothes or in female underpants, handcuffing them to the door of their cell—and the answer I got was, “This is how military intelligence (MI) wants it done.” . . . . MI has also instructed us to place a prisoner in an isolation cell with little or no clothes, no toilet or running water, no ventilation or window, for as much as three days.

The military-intelligence officers have “encouraged and told us, ‘Great job,’ they were now getting positive results and information,” Frederick wrote. “CID has been present when the military working dogs were used to intimidate prisoners at MI’s request.” At one point, Frederick told his family, he pulled aside his superior officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Phillabaum, the commander of the 320th M.P. Battalion, and asked about the mistreatment of prisoners. “His reply was ‘Don’t worry about it.’ ”

In November, Frederick wrote, an Iraqi prisoner under the control of what the Abu Ghraib guards called “O.G.A.,” or other government agencies—that is, the C.I.A. and its paramilitary employees—was brought to his unit for questioning. “They stressed him out so bad that the man passed away. They put his body in a body bag and packed him in ice for approximately twenty-four hours in the shower. . . . The next day the medics came and put his body on a stretcher, placed a fake IV in his arm and took him away.” The dead Iraqi was never entered into the prison’s inmate-control system, Frederick recounted, “and therefore never had a number.”

Frederick’s defense is, of course, highly self-serving. But the complaints in his letters and e-mails home were reinforced by two internal Army reports—Taguba’s and one by the Army’s chief law-enforcement officer, Provost Marshal Donald Ryder, a major general.

Last fall, General Sanchez ordered Ryder to review the prison system in Iraq and recommend ways to improve it. Ryder’s report, filed on November 5th, concluded that there were potential human-rights, training, and manpower issues, system-wide, that needed immediate attention. It also discussed serious concerns about the tension between the missions of the military police assigned to guard the prisoners and the intelligence teams who wanted to interrogate them. Army regulations limit intelligence activity by the M.P.s to passive collection. But something had gone wrong at Abu Ghraib.

There was evidence dating back to the Afghanistan war, the Ryder report said, that M.P.s had worked with intelligence operatives to “set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews”—a euphemism for breaking the will of prisoners. “Such actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant and docile state.” General Karpinski’s brigade, Ryder reported, “has not been directed to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor participate in those interrogations.” Ryder called for the establishment of procedures to “define the role of military police soldiers . . .clearly separating the actions of the guards from those of the military intelligence personnel.” The officers running the war in Iraq were put on notice.

Ryder undercut his warning, however, by concluding that the situation had not yet reached a crisis point. Though some procedures were flawed, he said, he found “no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices.” His investigation was at best a failure and at worst a coverup.

Taguba, in his report, was polite but direct in refuting his fellow-general. “Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that surfaced during [Ryder’s] assessment are the very same issues that are the subject of this investigation,” he wrote. “In fact, many of the abuses suffered by detainees occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment.” The report continued, “Contrary to the findings of MG Ryder’s report, I find that personnel assigned to the 372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to change facility procedures to ‘set the conditions’ for MI interrogations.” Army intelligence officers, C.I.A. agents, and private contractors “actively engaged in torture…”

Retired colonel Tom Laney says prosecutions need to reach high up the chain of command.

"If we're going to re-establish ourselves as a moral force, if we're going to hold ourselves above international law and hold ourselves separate from things like the International Criminal Court, then we have to be accountable to ourselves, and we have to re-establish accountability," Laney says. "That's what we need to do now is re-establish accountability. It can't be done by prosecuting sergeants and privates. When you've had a culture of coercion from the top, it's got to start at the top."

But will that happen? It's been widely noted that the officer who's just been ordered to clean up the prison system in Iraq is none other than Geoffrey Miller, the same major-general who Gitmo-ized the system in the first place.